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Abstract 
 
The electrification of trams has been one of the most significant changes in 
urban transport. It led to price reductions, increased speed, better regularity, comfort 
and convenience and the popularisation of this means of transport. Its introduction 
required a new business model, characterised by massive investment, modern 
management and the use of more sophisticated technology. 
 The Spanish case shows a certain delay in this process along with the importance 
of the foreign capital (from Belgium and backed by German electro mechanic 
multinationals), the little intensity of the backward looking effects, because the 
technological dependency, and the conquest of mobility as the main forward looking 
effect. 
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The electrification of trams has been one of the most significant changes in 
urban transport. It led to price reductions, increased speed, better regularity, comfort 
and convenience and the popularisation of this means of transport. Its introduction 
required a new business model, characterised by massive investment, modern 
management and the use of more sophisticated technology. In peripheral countries 
(where these factors were not very abundant), electrification led to the entry of powerful 
foreign business groups. These were mostly Belgians, often backed by German electro 
mechanic multinationals, interested in new openings for their products. Their strategy 
was very clear. Firstly, they initiated the unification and homogenisation of networks. 
Then they carried out electrification. Once the basic network was set up, they pulled 
back out of the Spanish market, pressured by the nationalist surroundings of the 
twenties.  
 The aim of this paper is to study this process in Spain. In this sense, we will 
firstly look at the electrification of trams, both from a chronological and geographical 
point of view.  Then we will analyse the change of the business model which facilitated 
the change from traction. Finally, we will evaluate the forward looking and backward 
looking effects of the electrification of urban transport. 
 
The process of tram electrification2  
                                                 
1
 A first draft of this article, in Spanish, has been published online, as a paper, in Fundación de las Cajas 
de Ahorro, Documento de Trabajo nº 535, 2010. I would also like to thank the useful comments and 
suggestions made by the three reviewers of the JUT. 
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 The first trams (which used animal traction) circulated in New York in 1832, but 
were not popular in Europe, including Spain, until 18703. The American leadership was 
motivated by larger and faster urbanisation, the more extensive character of this and 
maybe also by its greater predisposition to technical advances. Applying steam to trams 
clashed with the social opposition derived from its contaminating character in urban 
surroundings, (especially in Europe), so its use was restricted to suburban lines (McKay, 
1988). 
 The history of electric traction, initially applied to trams and later to the railway, 
is usually divided into three periods: 1835-1881 was the phase of trials then 1881-1895 
was the phase of resolving the problems of urban and suburban traction and 
subsequently those of interurban traction. Finally, from 1895, the adopted solutions 
were perfected (Cayón et al, 1998: 85). 
 The application of electricity to urban transport required a series of trials during 
the 1880s, until the version based on overhead contact wires triumphed. As hoped, the 
pioneers and leaders in the electrification of trams were Germany and especially the 
United States, powers which also led the Second Technical Revolution, of which 
electricity was one of its main components4. 
 The legislative impulse to the electrification of trams in Spain was set by the 
Law of 14/8/1895, which authorised the substitution of the traction system. It can be 
said that there was a symbiotic relationship between public policies, (particularly at 
local level) and tramway development5. The historical financial weakness of the 
Spanish state meant there was a preference for legislative means (which were far 
cheaper) over investment in promoting economic development. This also happened in 
public services like trams. Central government influenced the evolution of this sector, 
establishing the general regulatory frame in which the business activity had to be 
developed. In a broader sense, other aspects of its policies, such as commercial aspects 
(taxes on set input), monetary (type of exchange), fiscal (taxes on companies), social 
(labour costs), energy (availability and costs of electricity) or external (attitude towards 
foreign investment) have conditioned tramway firms, especially in certain situations. On 
the other hand, as this is an urban activity, the role played by local administration was 
by no means insignificant, due to the detailed regulation of the service established in the 
concession, including tariffs and administrative authorisation for its expansion6. 
Nevertheless, tram companies have not been passive but rather have tried (and 
succeeded on many occasions) to influence government decisions which affected them. 
For this, they used newspapers, contracted prestigious lawyers, accessed diplomatic 
representatives (in the case of foreign companies) and, above all, integrated prominent 
politicians to their Boards of Directors, both locally and nationally7. 
 By the end of the 19th century, more than 80 European cities (some of which 
were in more delayed places than Spain such as Eastern Europe) had already electrified 
their urban transport (Alayo and Manubens, 2007: 348). In the case of Spain, the first 
city to electrify its tram was Bilbao, in 1896, the work of a Belgian- German company. 
At that time, Spanish delay was relatively important as compared to the most of 
                                                                                                                                               
2
 A historical review on electricity in Spain in Cayón (2001). 
3
 See Tarr and Mcshane (2008) for information on the horse as urban technology.  
4
 Until 1882, Germany had the advantage (Siemens) (McKay, 1988: 10). 
5
 About the complex relationships among engineers, managers and politicians, see Hannah (1982). 
6
 Due to the chronic budget deficit of local public funds in Spain, no direct or indirect financial backing of  
loans was given to tramway companies like in the US.  
7
 For example Santiago Alba, a former President of  the Spanish government. 
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Western European countries (Table 1) and much more so with relation to the United 
States where the electrification of trams was far faster than in Europe8. The Spanish 
tram network was still very small, eminently urban and basically used animals. The 
electrification of lines was almost non-existent, both as regards absolute values and the 
percentage in the network. On the other hand, other countries of a size similar to Spain, 
including some far smaller countries like Belgium, enjoyed a far more extensive tram 
network.  In some cases like Italy, Belgium, Switzerland or France, suburban trams 
which used steam predominated9. The leading country of electrification of lines, both as 
regards kilometres and total percentage was Germany. Surprisingly, Britain used more 
animal traction than even Spain.  
Table 1. Length, in kms, of tramlines, according to the type of traction in Europe 
in 189510 
 
Animal 
traction Steam Electric Total 
Animal 
traction Steam Electric 
Country Kms Kms Kms Kms % % % 
Italy 248 2,478 40 2,766 9.0 89.6 1.5 
Germany 927 233 491 1,651 56.1 14.1 29.7 
France 566 798 130 1,495 37.9 53.4 8.7 
Great Britain 93511 200 68 1,202 77.8 16.6 5.6 
Belgium 119 1,056 26 1,200 9.9 87.9 2.1 
Spain 200 47 14 261 76.5 17.9 5.6 
Switzerland 26 224 32 282 9.1 79.4 11.4 
Source: Gerard, 1897: 297-299. 
 
 There are significant differences in the diffusion of tramway technologies in 
Spain. In the case of animal traction, the Spanish chronological lag was notable, almost 
four decades. Its technological matrix was Anglo-Saxon, with an American patent and 
English and Belgian implementation. British companies took centre stage as regards 
business and financing and implanted the first lines at the start of 1870 in large cities 
like Madrid and Barcelona. The electrification of networks presented a minor temporal 
lag, (15 years), a usual phenomenon in the Second Industrial Revolution and which is 
linked to the acceleration of technological change and its diffusion which accompanied 
this first globalisation of economies12. In this case, the technology came from the United 
States and, especially Germany. The latter also developed the traction motors and 
associated electrical equipment, whilst its Belgian associates dealt with the chassis and 
rails. Companies which carried out the electrification of networks were usually 
Belgians, but with a strong presence of electro-technical German capital (AEG and 
Siemens). The origin of the material is motivated by the comparative advantages of the 
                                                 
8
 In 1893, 60% of the 12,000 miles of the tram network were electrified; ten years later, 98% of its 30,000 
miles (McKay, 1988: 11). 
9
 For financial and technical reasons, French industrialists and technicians took some time to opt for 
electricity as compared to the traditional system of steam (Larroque, 1994: 1136). 
10
 A year of variation of statistics depending on countries. It distinguishes between the length of lines and 
tracks, the latter being larger. The first is adopted. The source seems to underestimate the length of the 
electric tramway network, at least in some countries such as Belgium, Italy or Great Britain. For instance, 
the Revista de Obras Públicas, 1900, I: 218, offers data for 1894-1899 which differs partially, also 
including electric railways. Moreover, according to the Annuario Statístico d´Italia, in 1898 its 
mechanical network was 3,106 kms long, 169 kms of which were electrified. 
11
 Taking into account, in this case, the big difference between the length of. lines and tracks, I adopted 
the  semiaddition of both. 
12
 On this aspect, see Derry and Williams (1960), and Dossi, Giannetti and Toninelli (eds.) (1992). 
4 
 
different countries in international commerce and helps one understand the dynamics of 
tram electrification. 
 Spain formed part of peripheral Europe (Mediterranean, Nordic and Eastern), 
which introduced and later electrified its tram networks to a large extent with the 
support of foreign capital (initially British and Belgian-German in the last phase of 
electrification). 
 In the mid thirties, the process of laying the basic networks and their 
electrification was completed in Europe (Table 2). The most developed countries had 
fundamentally produced the electrification of an already developed network at the end 
of the 19th century, whereas in countries which were a little behind like Spain, in the 
first third of the 20th century, there was a parallel process of growth of networks and 
their progressive electrification. In this way, there was a significant reduction of 
previous distances, although not total elimination, due to the persistence of differences 
in the levels of urbanisation and income. At this time, the trolleybus started to expand 
itself in Europe, especially in Great Britain,13 whilst in Spain the first line, in Bilbao, did 
not function until 1940. 
Table 2. Length, in kms, of electric tramlines in Europe, 1/1/1934 
Country kms 
Italy 2,88414 
Germany 1,990 
France 1,370 
Great Britain 1,354 
Spain 1,122 
Switzerland 583 
Belgium 349 
Source: Anuario de ferrocarriles y tranvías, 1935: XXXIX. 
 
 During the first years, at the end of the 19th century and the start of the 20th 
century, electrification advanced slowly, due to the technological limitations of 
electrical production (thermal generation) which made it more expensive (graphs 1 and 
2). The process accelerated in the decade previous to the First World War, coinciding 
with the second phase of Spanish electrification. The hydroelectric generation and 
technical advances in long distance transport allowed a substantial cost reduction and 
the consequent spread and diversification of its uses. The difficulties of the Great War 
and later crises put a halt to the growth of the network and the process of the 
substitution of animal traction and steam for electrical traction. Nevertheless, this 
dynamic was reintroduced in the mid twenties, coinciding with an expansive phase of 
the economy, urbanisation and business concentration. In this way, on the eve of the 
Spanish Civil War, the double process of expansion of the tram network and its 
electrification can be considered as practically concluded.  
Graph 1. Running Tramlines, depending on their type of traction in kms, 
1892-1934 
                                                 
13
 In 1935, there were 586 kms in exploitation, as compared to 71 in Italy and 27 in Germany 
(Ferrocarriles y Tranvías, November 1940: 342-344). 
14
 We replaced, for having little credibility, the data source (332 kms) by the Annuario Statístico d´Italia, 
which points at 1,730 km electrified suburban lines and 1,154 in urban areas. In general, data in the 
Anuario de ferrocarriles y tranvías appears undervalued, as they are well below those given by McKay 
(1976: 82) for 1913. 
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Source: 1892: Memorias de Obras Públicas, 1892; 1898-1900: Ministerio de Fomento. 
Dirección General de Obras Públicas, Estadística de las obras públicas de España, 
1898-1900. Madrid, Minuesa; 1901-1930: Ceballos15, 1932: 381; 1931-1934: Anuario 
Estadístico de España, 1931-1934. 
Graph 2. Running Tramlines, depending on their type of traction, in percentages, 
1898-1934 
 
Source: 1898-1900: Ministerio de Fomento. Dirección General de Obras Públicas, 
Estadística de las obras públicas de España, 1898-1900. Madrid, Minuesa; 1901-1930: 
Ceballos, 1932: 381; 1931-1934: Anuario Estadístico de España, 1931-1934 
 
Once we have seen the temporal sequence of electrification, we should analyse 
its special coverage in the Spanish territory (Table 3), to discover in this way its 
diffusion guidelines. The start of electrification took place in the largest and most 
                                                 
15
 One must take this author’s data with precaution as he does not quote his sources and his data does not 
coincide with the existing data for previous years of other quoted sources. In this sense, the graphs reflect 
trends rather than totally reliable data. 
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dynamic cities (Bilbao, Madrid and Barcelona), whose strong expectations of growth of 
demand made them more attractive for the powerful international investor groups who 
took the lead in these actions.16 These very cities had also been the pioneers in the 
introduction of the tram led by animal traction. In the three cities, electrification was 
carried out by Belgian-German capital, dominated by SOFINA.  The business strategy 
was quite similar, especially in the cases of Madrid and Barcelona (Martínez, 2002 and 
2006). In both major cities there were initially various small tram companies of 
generally indigenous capital but there were also some foreign ones, mainly British. 
Consequently, there was a plethora of lines, of different widths, without a coherent 
global design and with different management systems. This complex structure, with its 
intrinsic characteristics of animal traction and high tariffs led to a reduction in demand 
and negative results in operation.  
 The tendency for a natural monopoly and to take advantage of the economies of 
scale stimulated, in a quite rapid sequence, unification, homogenisation and 
electrification of networks. The process was undertaken by powerful Belgian/German 
business groups, a result of the merge of financial interests of these countries, of the 
metallurgical industry and Belgian mechanical construction, and, above all, of the 
German electro mechanical multinational AEG. The electrification of networks of the 
large cities was carried out quite quickly, having been completed at the start of the 20th 
century. Without this, it was not possible to carry out efficient and profitable 
management. 
 Electrification of average sized cities took place in the decade before the First 
World War, linked to the increase in the number of tram businesses during that period 
(see graph 3). Foreign capital investment was low as the market was less attractive. 
Local financial groups17 were now more prone to invest, due to previous experience in 
the large cities, the lower need for capital and the euphoria on higher returns. 
 The War and post War crisis meant a sudden halt to this investment, which was 
reintroduced at the start of the twenties, partly in small cities which profited from the 
advantages of latecomers to directly create new technology. In this sense, one must note 
the acceleration of the technological change, seen in the progressive reduction of the 
interval between the introduction of the tram of animal traction and the electric tram. In 
this final phase, the initiative came almost exclusively from local capital in relation to 
the nationalist situation of the moment and the small markets involved. In any case, and 
in an even clearer manner than in other more indispensable public works services (such 
as water or electricity), there is a minimum threshold of population, (modulated by its 
density) which allows the electric tram to be profitable. This figure tends to go down 
over time (as the service extends) and is around 30,000 inhabitants. Nevertheless, this is 
a necessary but insufficient condition, as seen in the fact that some Spanish cities which 
had a population higher than this did not manage to get the electric tram.  
Table 3. Geographical spread of electric tramway 
City 
The year the 
tram started 
The year the 
electric tram started 
Interval, in years, between the start 
of the tram and the electric tram 
Madrid 1871 1898 27 
Barcelona 1872 1899 27 
                                                 
16
 For foreign investment in Spain, see Broder (1981), Costa (1981), Tortella (2000) and Loscertales 
(2005). 
17
 The Escoriaza group and the banks Urquijo and Pastor are some of the most important ones. 
7 
 
Santander 1875 1908 33 
Bilbao 1876 1896 20 
Valencia 1876 1912 36 
Valladolid 1882 1910 28 
Zaragoza 1885 1902 17 
San Sebastián 1887 1897 10 
Sevilla 1887 1900 13 
Gijón 1890 1909 19 
Las Palmas 1890 1910 20 
Palma de Mallorca 1891 1916 25 
Alicante 1893 1924 31 
Oviedo 1895 1922 27 
A Coruña 1903 1913 10 
Granada 1904 1904 0 
Murcia 1906 1906 0 
Vigo 1914 1914 0 
Avilés 1921 1921 0 
Ferrol 1924 1924 0 
Pontevedra 1924 1924 0 
Source: local monographies. 
 
 The most extensive networks were situated, as one would hope, in the larger 
cities such Barcelona, Madrid and Bilbao. In percentage terms, electrification had 
advanced more in 1910 in these cities and in some medium-sized cities. On the 
contrary, small cities and most medium-sized cities had little electrification of their 
networks at that time. Two decades later, the panorama had changed radically. Most 
cities with public transport had already electrified their networks, although some small 
or less prosperous cities kept animal traction in smaller networks.  
 
Table 4. Distribution of the provincial network trams, 1910 and 1930 
 Total network, in mts % electrified Total network, in mts % electrified 
Province 1910 1910 1930 1930 
Alicante 52,243 0.0 30,500 85.2 
Badajoz 1,802 0.0 2,719 0.0 
Baleares 16,112 0.0 11,000 0.0 
Barcelona 164,831 65.4 109,430 100.0 
Cádiz 31,285 98.7 25,380 78.8 
Canarias 28,063 100.0 17,208 0.0 
Castellón 30,900 0.0 40,766 0.0 
Coruña 5,843 0.0 24,260 100.0 
Gerona 33,375 0.0   
Granada 13,553 82.4 123,381 98.1 
Guipúzcoa 19,073 72.5 58,888 100.0 
Jaén 41,781 100.0 17,860 100.0 
Madrid 109,467 66.1 187,241 79.7 
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Málaga 16,220 100.0 21,651 100.0 
Murcia 36,761 72.7 68,113 73.6 
Oviedo 37,478 23.7 73,993 69.8 
Pontevedra 7,230 0.0 85,460 100.0 
Santander 25,623 66.9 23,849 100.0 
Sevilla 25,859 100.0 45,000 100.0 
Tarragona 3,554 0.0 3,554 0.0 
Valencia 75,567 54.9 106,039 94.7 
Valladolid 51,461 0.0 11,000 100.0 
Vizcaya 106,169 81.9 125,493 100.0 
Zaragoza 15,639 100.0 30.000 100,0 
     
Totales 949,889 57.4 1,242,785 86.2 
Source: Ministerio de Fomento. Dirección General de Obras Públicas, Estadística de las obras 
públicas de España, 1910. Madrid, Minuesa, 1910: 340-341; Anuario Estadístico de España, 
1930: 495. 
 
The change of the business model  
 
 Electrification of networks demanded significant investment on the part of 
tramway companies and this led to their expansion. These firms were amongst the 
largest ones in the country.18 This is especially true in medium-sized and small cities, in 
which utilities businesses often represented the first and main example of a large 
modern company. 
 The creation of tramway companies had its defining moment from 1890-1910, 
as the entrepreneurial fever was waning (Graph 3). Nevertheless, the evolution of 
business size, expressed as the average capital in the set up, presented an almost 
opposing profile. Until 1902, the trend was low, and new companies with animal 
traction were created in average-sized cities. From 1903-1924, with the exception of the 
pause caused by the Great War, companies’ capital increased19, and firms were created 
which started the electrification of their lines, for those which had high financial 
resources. These resources did not come solely from their own funds, via the actions of 
the founders or through increased capital but increasingly from distant funds via 
debentures issues in the capital markets (local market in the case of small and medium-
sized companies and international in the case of the large foreign companies). This 
tendency to use more debentures than shares was due to the increasing needs of capital, 
the wish to externalise risks and the expansion of the financial markets. 
Graph 3. Creation of tram companies, 1886-1935, five-yearly measures 
                                                 
18
 In 1917, three tram companies (one in Madrid and two in Barcelona) figured amongst the 50 largest 
Spanish companies. Nevertheless, the progressive growth of other sectors of the Spanish economy and its 
growing investment reduced this to one single company in 1930 (Carreras and Tafunell, 2005: 788-789). 
19
 The sharp rise in average capital between 1916-1920 was due to the influence of the large firm 
Sociedad Madrileña de Tranvías, set up in 1920 with 75 million pts. 
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Source: Anuario de la Dirección General de los Registros y del Notariado, 1886-1909 
and 1911-1959.20 Capital in millions of pts. 
 
Whereas small companies of animal traction could originally satisfy their 
(reduced) needs with their own resources and self-financing, the greater financial 
demands of electrification and the network expansion obliged them to accept a radical 
rethinking of the companies’ financial strategies. These had to be increasingly backed 
by banking institutions, both to solve treasury problems and, above all, to ensure long 
term financing. This banking support was shown not so much in the direct package of 
resources but in the placing of securities (shares and debentures between its clients), 
which tended to expand local capital markets, mainly in medium-sized cities. In other 
cases, especially in large towns, they were electro-mechanical companies (mainly 
German) which either directly or frequently through electro-tramway holdings or 
banking institutions, provided the financial resources21. The significant investment 
effort occasionally made the financial balance of companies difficult, especially in 
small cities and when the results obtained did not respond to the expectations generated. 
This lag occurred mainly in suburban lines, threatened by the competition of buses and 
lorries. (Martínez (dir.), 2006). 
Electrification meant there would be a significant change in companies’ assets, 
with a higher weight of fixed capital assets as opposed to working capital. Rolling stock 
valuation increased due to the higher cost of engines. 
 The change did not affect purely the size and business financing, but also the 
actual management of companies. Electrification demanded a thorough reorganisation 
of companies, in order to optimise resources (both human and material) which were 
now more technical and expensive. All this led to the application of the new managerial 
model based on separating property and management, with growing professionalism of 
the latter and greater weight put on technicians22. The companies’ management passed 
into the hands of experts who came from the field of engineering, reflecting the 
                                                 
20
 This source presents some limitations, highlighted by Carreras and Tafunell (2005: 710). 
21
 In France, the 1880 Law prevented tramway companies from giving out debentures of a higher amount 
than their capital. This led electro-mechanical groups to participate although these tended to part with 
their share packages after the Great War (Larroque, 1994: 1138). 
22
 This managerial style was more French or Belgian than American. In fact, it is not possible to use 
Chandler’s model of management for American railways in European tram companies. See the special 
issue of Business History Review, summer 2008, vol. 82 issue 2 for information on Chandler’s 
achievements and his critics. 
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importance given to this factor. In fact, in many small and medium-sized companies, it 
was the utility companies, which introduced these new methods in the local business 
surroundings, acting not only as technological disseminators but as management 
models23. The diffusion of management practices occurred through several mechanisms: 
mainly mediating influence of investment banks and interlocking Boards of Directors24, 
and to a lesser extent through a community of technological practitioners25. It’s unclear 
where the explanatory forces lie, because the technology and the business model 
probably operated dialectically and developed each other.   
The car-km costs reduced with electrification, although so did income, due to the 
initial lower occupation of wagons, to larger distances and to the fact the tickets were 
now cheaper. However, despite the fact that the unitary margin of exploitation reduced, 
global benefits increased as did the volume of business. Despite the initial beneficial 
effect of electrification, income became stagnant in absolute terms from the third decade 
and even declined by km of line mainly due to the implementation of buses, especially 
on distant lines (Graph 4). Buses were more appealing than trams, as they were faster, 
more autonomous, versatile, less vulnerable and demanded less initial investment26. 
Nevertheless, the difficulty to obtain fuel during the Civil War and long Post War 
period delayed the substitution of technological model. In any case, the monographs 
available (Martínez (dir.), 2006) suggest that electrification lead to a favourable 
qualitative jump as regards profitability, which remained positive during the twenties 
and was only slightly impacted by the Great Depression27. 
This article will not focus on the substitution of electric trams by buses. 
Nevertheless, one must point out that it was a slow process which lasted through the 
second third of the 20th century, with the trolleybus as transition technology. As the 
process was frequently initiated by the actual tramway companies themselves28, this 
resulted, on the whole, in a new smaller and more dynamic business model and 
management29. 
Graph 4. Income of tram companies, 1901-1930 
                                                 
23
 Chandler (1977) has pointed out, in the case of North America, how the managerial revolution began in 
railway companies, later extending to other industrial sectors. 
24
 This practice was quite common, especially in foreign companies. 
25
 On the diffusion of managerial practices, see Chandler (1977, 1990),  Hannah (1976). 
26
 On a more generic approach, the beginning of the competition between railroad and road transport, see 
Hernández Marco ( 2002). 
27
 In other countries such as France, the behaviour was less favourable as the operating ratio of the period 
between the wars went back to the levels of the period of animal traction, 85% (Larroque, 1994: 1140). In 
Britain and American urban railways, electrification meant an initial deterioration of the operating ratio, 
although figures were more favourable, 55%-70% (Reilly, 1989: 24-26). 
28
 For instance, Tranvías de Zaragoza set up Autobuses Urbanos de Zaragoza in 1934. 
29
 See, for instance, what happened  in A Coruña (Martínez, 2006). 
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Source: Ceballos, 1932: 381. 
 
The impact of electrification 
 
 When we talk of the (economic) impact of a means of transport, we usually 
distinguish between its impacts on sectors which supply resources (backward-looking 
effects) and its incidence via the improvement of mobility (forward-looking effects). 
This focus is usually reductionist, as it does not evaluate social or environmental aspects 
which are more difficult to evaluate quantitatively. This type of exercise has generally 
been carried out for railways30. Here we will apply it in the case of the electrification of 
trams. 
 
The backward-looking limited effects: technological dependency  
 
 The main input and supplies provided to tramway companies in their process of 
network electrification were capital, electricity, fixed assets, rolling stock and 
technological developments. 
 The investment for electrification of tramway networks was logically far higher 
than that needed for the main lines of animal traction, due to the price rise it needed and, 
above all, the new fixed capital (rails, electricity distribution system) and the higher 
costs due to the larger size and sophistication of rolling stock. In relative terms, 
investment in urban transport was a modest 5.9% of the total investment in 
infrastructures from 1890-1935, overtaking that of telecommunications31. Its investment 
was much lower than that of the railway during the critical phase of its construction, 
64.7% from 1845-1890 (Herranz, 2008: 35). In this sense, the diversion of capital for 
electrification was not a hindrance to other sectors for various reasons. Firstly, for its 
reduced quantity in terms of percentage of GDP and secondly, as it was produced at a 
time when Spanish industrialisation was already set up and the financial markets were 
more developed. Finally, most of the required capital (increased capital and distribution 
of debentures) came from abroad: Belgium32 (with German33 backing) for shares and 
                                                 
30
 For the Spanish case: Comín et al (1998): 101-148 and a current revision done by Herranz (2008: 131-
176). 
31
 It reached its greatest participation (11.7%) from 1916-1925. 
32
 Some of the most important shareholders, according to the Recueil Financier, were the families Allard, 
Empain, Fichefet, Fris, Grumiaux, Hammelrath, Ithier, Jacobs, Jansenn, Lagasse de Locht, Lambeau, 
Passelecq, Philips, Ranscelot, Thys and Urban. 
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the markets of Brussels and Paris for debentures34. Nevertheless, in small and medium-
sized cities, the local capital took on a more dominant role – due to lower foreign 
interest in its market. This stimulated the local capital market and led to modernisation 
of its financial system. However, in these types of cities, it was often difficult to attract 
capital due to the local investors’ reticence when faced with an activity perceived as 
high risk when compared to the traditional and safer investments of real estate and state 
securities. 
 Electrification of transport meant a growing source of demand for electricity 
companies (Graph 5). Electric consumption, in absolute terms, grew at a continuous 
rate (although moderately) until the First World War, due to the limitation of the 
network and the high price of energy obtained via thermal means. The War led to a halt 
in demand due to the stagnation of electrification for financial reasons and the 
importation of material. The twenties signified the Golden Age of electric consumption 
in traction, due to the strong growth of the electrified tram network, the setting up of the 
underground systems in Madrid (1919) and Barcelona (1924) and the development of 
rail electrification (basically narrow gauge). The Depression led to stagnation of this 
process, due to the fall in demand, compounded by the Civil War and the destruction of 
infrastructure and rolling stock. Recovery was slow during the forties, due to the 
electrical restrictions of the time and coincided with the gradual substitution of trams by 
trolley buses.  The most spectacular growth would take place in the second half of the 
fifties but led now by wide track railways, and a dismantling plan was undertaken from 
1956 for narrow gauge railways (Olaizola, 2005: 839-840).  
Graph 5. Consumption of electricity for traction in Spain, in gigawatts and 
percentage on the total35, 1901-1959 
 
Source: Anuario Estadístico de España, 1901-1959. 
 
 In relative terms, the contribution of traction to electrical consumption was 
modest as it practically never went over 10%36.  Nevertheless, for electric companies, 
                                                                                                                                               
33
 In the case of Germany, a significant person is Dannie Heineman, Director of AEG, and who is on the 
Tramway Board in Barcelona. 
34
 On the role of multinational enterprises and international finance on the global electrification, see 
Hausman, Hertner and Wilkins (2008). 
35
 Includes railways, losses and self consumption. 
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especially in cities with little electrified industry, the demand from trams, with public 
lighting, made up a relatively significant part of its business37, which was especially 
relevant during the first years, when private consumption was still scarce. Tram 
companies represented a safety net for volume and stability with regards to fluctuations 
and uncertainty of private demand. This interest by electrical companies to boost this 
segment of demand explains its presence – direct or via holdings or connected banks -, 
in the shareholdings of tram companies, especially those in the phase of moving from 
animal traction to electrical. In fact, it could be said that the electrification of trams was 
(to a large extent) motivated by the electromechanical multinationals’ search for new 
markets in a similar way to what would happen decades later with the car industry and 
oil companies. 
 Traction increased continuously during the first decade of the 20th century, 
coinciding with the first phase of tram electrification. The second decade was a 
backward step which suggests that the difficulties of Great War affected it more than 
industry. The twenties was the era of greater importance and stability. The crisis of the 
thirties meant a progressive fall which continued during the forties and, especially, 
fifties. The performance of traction is logically linked to the behaviour of the others 
components of consumption. Lighting fell from almost its initial 70% to 13% in the Post 
War and stayed around this figure later on. The fastest and most spectacular growth 
occurred in engines which moved from 11% in 1907 to 59% in 1929, fluctuating around 
this figure from then onwards. In turn, losses and self consumption tended to increase 
gradually especially from 1933, and were 20%-25% of the total. 
Electrification demanded a very high volume of investment, in absolute terms 
and in kilometres of lines when compared to the era of animal traction. The rails needed 
were heavier and more expensive. Finally, the overhead cable and electrical sub stations 
had to be installed. All this new infrastructure generated a significant source of demand 
which was essentially met through previous imports from Germany and Belgium,  and 
through companies connected to electro-tramway holdings of these countries 
(Unternehmergeschäft), following guidelines in line with competition law. In this sense, 
a large number of rails, wagons and chassis came from Belgium whilst the Germans 
provided practically all of the electrical installations. The geographical origin of the 
suppliers of the fixed and rolling stock for Spanish trams is particularly interesting for 
the analysis of possible connections between the tramway companies and the 
manufacturers of these materials.  
 Electricity was one of the main innovations of the Second Technological 
Revolution. Its flexibility, versatility and economy meant a significant improvement as 
compared to previous energy sources. The first experiments in the field of transport 
developed in trams, due to their clear superiority compared to animal traction and to 
steam in an urban environment (McKay, 1976).  Spain, like other countries in Europe, 
remained a straggler in technological innovation, especially in leading sectors such as 
                                                                                                                                               
36
 The invoiced consumption would be somewhat higher, not including losses and self consumption. 
Nevertheless, in terms of income, the percentage would be less as the average price of kwh per traction 
was less than per strength and overall, than for lighting (0.08 pts, 0.11 pts and 0.60 pts in 1935, 
respectively, Bartolomé (2007: 18). 
37
 In 1929, the final electrical commercial consumption in traction was 9.9% of the total in Spain, only 
overtaken in Mediterranean and Northern Europe by Portugal and, probably Greece, which showed its 
negative correlation with electrical intensification and the level of industrial development (Bartolomé, 
2007: 18). In neighbouring Portugal, the percentage of electrical consumption in traction varied 
considerably from some cities to others, with a positive correlation to its size, at around  15%-25% of the 
total from 1930-1945 and representing  2-5 times more than public illumination (Cardoso de Matos et al., 
2004: 392). 
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the electrical sector. This delay was seen in the reduced number of patents registered by 
nationals: 35.2% in electrical material between 1882-1935, with a Technological 
Developing Advantage of 0.7 (Sáiz, 2006: 62). 
 In the case of electrical traction, the patents registered for the Spanish in 1883-
1935 only signified 11.5% of individuals and 3.6% of companies. In the former, the 
Americans predominated, with a third in total, followed by the Italians, French, British 
and Germans with 8%-14%. Amongst companies, the concentration was larger, 
dominated by the French -especially Thomson Houston de la Mediterranée38-, with half, 
followed by the Swiss with a quarter (Brown Boveri) and the Germans (Siemens) with 
12% (Cayón et al, 1998: 96-99). The French company was a branch of a homonymous 
North American group and used to channel the patents of General Electric. In turn, the 
Swiss electrical sector maintained strict links with German multinationals39. 
From this, one can gather that the technological innovation spread in Spain came 
overwhelmingly from the two leading countries: the USA and Germany. One can see a 
certain specialisation in companies / countries. The French North Americans dominated 
the general improvement of the engine, transmission and suspension, governing systems 
(electric traction), the third rail and the underground channel. In turn, the Swiss and 
Germans controlled locomotives and electric motor units, apparatus of power points 
and, above all, the overhead power cables. 
 These managed to hold the most relevant patents which they ended up 
imposing. Most electric transport patents refer to traction (58%), as opposed to 42% of 
alimentation systems. Among the first, those linked to wire apparatus dominated (22%). 
 With regard to alimentation systems, most patents referred to the underground 
channel (52,6%), as opposed to the overhead power cables (43%) and the third rail 
(4.4%), although it was the overhead power cable which ended up being imposed in 
Spain, like in the rest of the world (Cayón et al, 1998: 99; McKay, 1976). We do not 
know the chronological evolution of the type of patent registered, but it is highly likely 
that, like in other countries, the basic patents of traction and alimentation until 1914 and 
those linked to travellers’ safety and comfort during the period between the Wars took 
precedence40. 
  From 1897-1901, the highest number of patents was registered, coinciding with 
the boom of tram patents in general and companies being set up. Until 1920, most 
inventions were related to trams, whilst the relative saturation of this market and plans 
to electrify the railways from this date stimulated the market towards railways. The 
period between the Wars was the Golden Age for electric trams, making it a mature 
sector, as the level of technological innovation reduced, increasing the barriers for the 
greater needs of businesses41. Indeed, most of the material (both fixed and rolling stock) 
was acquired and installed in the fifteen years before the start of the Great War. 
Progressive obsolescence of this material occurred between the Wars42. On the other 
                                                 
38
 For Thomson-Houston’s strategies for the electrification of urban transport, see Froelicher, 1991. Rail 
electrification in France was due to American technology, even if it became progressively independent 
during the period between the wars, a step in which French technology had a notable influence on Spain  
(Bouneau, 1993). 
39
 On the international strategies of the electromechanical companies of these two countries, see Broder 
(1982), Hertner (1986) and Segreto (1994). 
40
 This was what happened in France for example (Larroque, 1994: 1143). 
41
 In France, the curve of registration of urban transport patents also declined progressively from 1904, 
the decline of the twenties and thirties being especially notorious (Larroque, 1994: 1143). 
42A similar process occurred in France, including the countless repairs of material in the companies’ own 
workshops. By contrast, American firms commissioned 17,500 new trams between 1921-1939 (Larroque, 
1994: 1145-1146).  
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hand, each urban tram network used to belong to a different company as the process of 
business concentration in the sector had been limited generally to the range of each city. 
For this, there was a lack of standardisation of materials, partly eased by limiting their 
origin to certain manufacturers, most of which were foreign43. 
 The lack of renewed material worsened in Spain case during the Civil War and 
Post War, due to the difficulty of importing the necessary technology, forcing 
companies to overexploit material and resort to their own workshops to reinstall parts 
from previously discarded rolling stock. All this led to a situation which culminated in 
the disappearance of trams from Spanish cities in the sixties, preceded by the trolley bus 
(in the 40s and 50s) as an alternative means of transit between electrical technology and 
the internal combustion engine44. 
 On the other hand, the spread of electricity advanced slowly, especially with 
regard to the railway, due to problems of demand, a high initial cost and a tendency for 
an oligopsony. The electrification of transport took place mainly in trams, secondly in 
narrow gauge railways (in the Basque country above all) and, to a far lesser extent, wide 
track45. 
 All this explains the minimal development of electro-mechanics in Spain and the 
strong dependency of importation, especially before the First World War46. This came 
mainly from the USA, Switzerland and, especially, Germany47. In fact, Spain limited 
itself in most cases to the fabrication of less sophisticated components such as rails48, 
railcar casing, trailers and overhead cables.  In any case, the impact of electrification of 
trams in the Spanish metal and mechanical construction industry was higher than that of 
half a century previously with railways, due to the move from a free trade policy (just 
for the railway materials) to a protectionist one and to the incipient development of 
Spanish industry49. The main Spanish manufacturers of rolling tram (and rail) stock 
were the companies Talleres Carde and Escoriaza, and Compañía Auxiliar de 
Ferrocarriles (CAF), the first being acquired by CAF in 1947. Escoriaza moved from 
public works contractors to builders of rolling stock and from here to promoters of 
tramway companies (Zaragoza, Granada, Cádiz, San Sebastián, etc) and narrow track 
railways, setting a clear example of the trend already mentioned and the vertical 
integration between tramway companies and material suppliers. It is important to stress 
their early and continuous relationships with French and Belgian entrepreneurs and 
financers, namely Thomson-Houston, a manufacturer of tram engines. They also 
maintained close collaboration with the Urquijo group, CAF’s main shareholder and 
                                                 
43
 In contrast, the two main Spanish rail companies (Norte and MZA) went from owning 55% of the total 
number of wide track locomotives in 1877 to 74% in 1914 (Comín et al, 1998: 103). 
44
 Faced with the major expansion of the trolleybus in Anglo-Saxon countries from the end of the 
twenties; in other countries such as France, its development was much less. (Larroque, 1994: 1148). 
45
 In the mid-thirties, there were 1,122 kms of electrified tramlines, as compared with 787 narrow gauge 
and 400 wide track (Anuario Estadístico de España, 1934 and Olaizola, 2005: 835). 
46
 In 1913, domestic production was slightly over a third of electrical material consumption in Spain. The 
increase of protectionism favoured a certain process of substitution of imports so that in 1925, Spanish 
production fulfilled almost 40% of its consumption (Tena, 1988: 362).  Customs barriers stimulated the 
introduction in Spain of electromechanical multinationals, especially German ones. (Loscertales, 2005). 
47
 Germany’s market share in the Spanish market reached its highest in 1910, with 70%. It maintained this 
supremacy despite being affected by the Great War and the rise of the USA, during the interwar period, 
with 18% in 1926 and 28% in 1935 (Tena, 1988: 353). 
48
 The importation of rails fell from 63% of consumption in 1891-1902 to 26% in 1902-1914 (Comín et 
al, 1998: 114). 
49
  To our knowledge, there are no specific studies on the manufacturing of tramway material in Spain. 
Most recent literature on the mechanical construction industry does not analyse this subsector (Pascual & 
Fernández (eds.), 2007).  
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also strongly compromised in electrical, railway and tramway businesses. (Puig y 
Torres, 2008). The narrow market and the irregularity of demand for rolling stock for 
railways and trams meant that in Spain auxiliary railway companies were unable to 
develop a strategy of specialisation. This forced the Escoriaza group to diversify from 
the ‘20s: bus bodywork, mining wagons, locksmith’s material, material for the Army, 
real estate promotion etc (Núñez, 2000) and also CAF from the ‘30s: spanning farming 
machinery, bus and tram bodywork, the construction of railcars as well as the 
manufacture of foundry material50. 
This tendency to “Hispanicise” the material was reinforced from the twenties 
with the acquisition of foreign tramway companies by Spanish financial groups led by 
the Urquijo Bank, in the increasingly nationalist framework of the era (Table 5). This 
impulse towards the mechanical industry strengthened with state help given to the rail 
companies, which also moved into Spanish hands during these years.  
Table 5. Rolling stock of Madrid’s tram network 
Acquiring Company  Material Number Year Supplying Company 
Madrid Street Tramway trailer 106 1871  
Madrid Street Tramway railcar 55 1898 Monasterios (Madrid), Carde y Escoriaza (Zaragoza). 
Engines Thomson Houston 
Madrileña de Tracción railcar 50 1901 Engines Schuckert. 
Madrileña de Tracción trailer 25 1901  
Madrileña de 
Urbanización 
locomotive 17 1901 Krauss, Koppel 
Madrileña de 
Urbanización 
trailer 34 1906  
Madrileña de 
Urbanización 
railcar 31 1908 Carde y Escoriaza. Engines Thomson Houston 
SGTEE railcar 182 1900 25 Belgian engines, 100 Westinghouse and 57 
Thomson Houston 
SGTEE trailer 28 1901  
SGTEE railcar 80 1908 Franco-Belga de la Croyere. Engines Charleroi 
SGTEE trailer 27 1908 Franco-Belga de la Croyere 
SGTEE trailer 82 1914 Franco-Belga de la Croyere 
SMT railcar 50 1922 Lladró Cunat (Almacera-Valencia). Engines Charleroi 
SMT railcar 50 1925 Carde y Escoriaza (15), Lladró Cunat (25) and CAF 
(10). Engines Charleroi 
SMT railcar 3 1930 CAF. Engines Westinghouse and Charleroi 
SMT railcar 65 1932 CAF. Engines General Electric 
SMT trailer 50 1943 CAF and Electromecánica de Córdoba 
SMT railcar 160 1946 Fiat (110) in collaboration with CAF, Montajes 
Móviles y Construcciones. Engines General Electric 
SMT railcar 125 1947 Auxiliar de Transporte, Los Certales and Material y 
Construcciones. Recycled engines Charleroi and 
General Electric 
Source: López Bustos, 1986: 182-245. 
 
The forward-looking effects: the conquest of mobility  
 
Mobility is a polysemic term born in the 1920s with the works of Sorokin and 
the Chicago School. This school conceived mobility, alongside the process of 
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 http://www.euskomedia.org/aunamendi/31782  
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urbanisation, as a factor of social disorganisation, breaking equilibrium. At the dawn of 
World War II, the field of mobility was already divided between sociological research, 
which defined it principally as a change of position, role or status, and transport science 
which regarded it as flows of movement in space (Kaufmann, 2009; Gallez and 
Kaufmann). 
Traditionally, historiography has analysed this theme preferentially from the 
point of view of the offer, (like the history of transport), subdivided into different 
sectorial fields: land, sea and air. Recently however, a new vision has opened up, 
focused on the study of the demand, i.e. a history of mobility (Floneau and Guigueno, 
2009). This methodological reorientation is in relation to the importance attributed to 
the phenomenon of mobility in modern societies (mobility turn) and the need to 
overcome the impenetrable behaviour which prevents interdisciplinary dialogue. The 
debate which arises presents a new paradigm, which is still underway. This new 
paradigm is characterised by its interdisciplinary and transnational focus. This 
historiographic trend is seen for example in the shift (as a main object of research), from 
the railway to the road, from collective transport to individual transport, from an 
economic to a cultural focus, from the long-term to the period after the Second World 
War and from the British area to that of continental Europe (Mom, 2009; Mom, Divall 
and Lyth, 2009). 
Traditional public transport using animal traction had serious limitations for 
satisfying urban populations’ demand for mobility e.g. low capacity, reduced speed, 
rigidity and hygiene problems all of which resulted in higher fares. This limited its use 
to the enjoyment of the Upper Classes. As compared to steam, the advantage of 
electricity was its lower environmental impact, its low cost and possibility of travelling 
over rough terrain. Electrification allowed these restrictions to be overcome, bringing 
about a real revolution of urban transport, facilitating what one could call “the conquest 
of mobility”. This would form part of a larger process of modernisation of Spanish 
society and, especially of its cities (urbanism, public services), which developed during 
the first third of the 20th century (Cardesín and Mirás, 2008). 
 Electrical traction allowed the speed and frequency of trams to increase, 
although its dependency on the source of supply made it more vulnerable as usually 
occurs with more sophisticated technology. The carriages could now be larger, hold 
more people and were more comfortable. The high cost of the new fixed and mobile 
rolling stock encouraged a more intensive use to recoup costs more quickly: from here, 
there was an increase in kms travelled by railcars and lines. These could now extend to 
the suburbs, including on uneven surfaces and slopes. The advantages of electricity 
were especially evident for intense traffic and for long distances, particularly on uneven 
territories, providing that the concession was long enough to allow  the redemption and 
repayment of the high investment needed51. Large companies which were involved in 
the unification and electrification of networks aimed to secure greater line concessions. 
On the whole, they achieved this, prolonging concessions until after the Civil War.  
 The increase of the scale of operations allowed cost reduction, and clients’ fares 
then reduced. This led to a gradual increase both in the number of users and the annual 
average number of journeys. It progressively became a more popular means of 
transport52, used increasingly for daily work journeys, not simply weekly or yearly. 
Nevertheless, this increased mobility depended on the size of the population in the 
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 Congreso internacional de ferrocarriles, tranvías y electricidad celebrado en París en 1900. Memorias 
de los ingenieros de caminos, canales y puertos. Madrid, 1901: 273-279. 
52
 In 1910 in European cities, transport signified 2.5%-4.5% of the salary of a qualified worker (Capuzzo, 
2000: 630-631). 
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centre and on the substitution of the combined artisanal model (working / residential 
space) by the industrial model whereby working and living took place in separate spaces 
(Capuzzo, 2000: 631-632). The nature of the available sources does not let us provide 
greater detail on the users of the Spanish tramways, their attitudes toward tramway 
construction and electrification (and the disruptions that that process entailed), and the 
degree to which the construction of new tramways and the electrification of existing 
tramways altered patterns of mobility. Nevertheless, it is generally admitted in literature 
that the electrification of trams led to an extensive and intensive increase of their use.  
 Social construction of technology (SCOT) is a theory which argues than 
technological choices are shaped by social groups’ interests53. It is not enough, 
according to SCOT, to explain a technology's success by saying that it is "the best" -- 
researchers must look at how the criteria of being "the best" is defined and what groups 
and stakeholders participate in defining it. The most basic relevant groups are the users 
and the producers of the technology, but sometimes also politicians and journalists. 
Some of its core concepts are The Principle of Symmetry, the Interpretative Flexibility, 
the Design Flexibility and the Closure Mechanisms. The symmetry principle, adopted 
from the Strong Programme of Sociology, holds that all arguments (social, cultural, 
political, economic, as well as technical) that social actors put forward for the 
acceptance/rejection of any technology are to be treated equally. Interpretative 
Flexibility means that each technological artefact has different meanings for various 
groups and these alternative interpretations generate different problems to be solved. On 
the other hand, Design Flexibility holds that there are multiple ways of constructing 
technologies, reflecting the interpretations of certain relevant groups. Over time, as 
technologies are developed, the interpretative and design flexibility collapse through 
closure mechanisms, but closure is not permanent. New social groups may form and 
reintroduce interpretative flexibility, causing a new round of debate or conflict about a 
technology54. The SCOT´s approach can help us to better understand how the 
electrification of tramways took place in Spain and how the different social groups 
(various kinds of users, tramways companies, electromechanical multinationals, 
politicians at different administration levels and urban technicians) shaped its 
development. 
 From an aesthetic point of view, the visual impact of overhead cables in urban 
centres sometimes made their installation difficult due to the reticence on the part of 
municipal employees and public opinion55. Nevertheless, opposition was less than in 
other European countries, probably due to the delay of the process in Spain or perhaps 
to the urban cultural context of Southern Europe versus Northern Europe, more 
concerned in the last case to preserve historical heritage, as we can still see nowadays. 
In Europe, there was clear preference for the overhead cable as opposed to other 
technical alternatives such as the underground cable or third rail.    
 Another very important aspect of the electrification of transport, (through the 
development of urban networks of transport that it brought about), was its impact on 
urban structures and on the location of economic activities, above all commercial, for 
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 Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch (eds.) (1987); a critical vision of SCOT in Winner (1993). 
54
 For instance, the recent debate about the reintroduction of tramways in Spain due to the new ecological 
sensitivity. 
55
 This criterion had greater weight in European cities than in the USA. In the first, 72% of alimentation 
systems used overheard contact in 1893, a percentage which increased to 83% in 1899 (McKay, 1988: 12-
13; 1976: 76). In the French case, the problem was resolved by installing overhead wire in the outskirts 
and subterranean cable in the city centre (Larroque, 1994: 1137). On the other hand, British construction 
and maintenance techniques of the heavy rails which then demanded electric traction were superior to 
those of North America (Semsel, 2001: 51). 
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which visibility and accessibility were key (Mirás 2005). This theme has not yet been 
wholly explored, although it has been discussed by several authors (Monclús and Oyón, 
1996; Oyón, 1999). The tram acted as a vector of urban growth, reinforcing a structure 
of radial character which linked the centre to the periphery, initially the Borghese 
districts of the Ensanche56 (Widened districts) but later also to popular districts. As 
compared to the simple and reduced initial networks (animal traction) which would link 
the city centre with the railway station and the Borghese Ensanche, electrified networks 
were denser, more complex and longer, favouring the slow homogenisation of urban 
space and growth towards peripheral and suburban areas, establishing the basis for the 
future Underground system. The creation of urban space and added value through 
transport was seen, for example, in the promotion of specific lines57, building 
companies by tram companies58 or in the participation of shared Directors or even 
famous town planners on the Board of both types of companies59.  
 Spain followed, despite a small lag behind more developed countries. The 
increase in the number of travellers basically took place during the second decade of the 
20th century, coinciding with the extension of networks and their electrification60. This 
was also seen in the strong increase in the number of travellers per line. However, while 
the number of users continued to grow during the twenties, albeit at a less intense 
rhythm, the number of travellers per line tended to fall. This suggests that in this stage, 
the growth was extensive, based on the expansion of networks, but that the new 
peripheral lines were less attractive as regards volumes of transported travellers, coming 
up against the growing competition of other means of transport such as the 
Underground in large cities and the bus in suburban lines61.   
Graph 6. Travellers transported by tram, 1901-1930 
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 Ensanche means "widening" in Spanish and is used to name the development areas of Spanish cities 
around the end of the 19th century. 
57
 For instance, in some cities (A Coruña, Vigo – mainly in the suburbs) the Board of Directors insisted 
on building and maintaining unprofitable, financially problematic service lines, probably because they 
owned land in those villages.  
58
 The Escoriaza group, the owner of tramway companies in Zaragoza and Granada, created various real 
estate companies in these cities.  
59
 This is the case, for example, of the Compañía de Tranvías de La Coruña and Compañía Coruñesa de 
Urbanización, which shared several Directors, or the  urbanite Arturo Soria  and his Compañía Madrileña 
de Urbanización, which promoted tram lines in Madrid.  
60
 The great increase in the number of travellers because of the electrification of trams was somewhat 
common in cities. For various large European cities, it fluctuated between 40-80% in the first five-year 
period, Capuzzo (2003: 28). 
61
 The problems derived from the recession of the ‘30s, the Civil War and the autarky, postponed the 
substitution of trams by buses in Spain, also delaying the decline of public transport. See Martínez (2006) 
for a concrete example.  
In Central Europe, unlike Paris and especially London, the role of buses in suburbanisation was lower and 
occurred later, Capuzzo (2003).   
For the impact on the different transport technology in work displacement, see, Pooley, Turnbull and 
Adams (2006).  
On the decline of urban public transport in the USA and Germany, see Yago (1984). 
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Source: Ceballos, 1932: 381. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 The electrification of Spanish trams basically took place in the decade before the 
First World War. The process developed slightly behind Western Europe although the 
lag was less than with the implementation of animal traction. The process was 
concluded by 1930. The electrification of trams and the expansion of the networks were 
shaped by institutional regulations, at national and local level, as in other European 
countries. 
 Electrification started in the large cities, later spreading to medium-sized cities. 
In small cities, networks were “born” already electrified. The process was led, 
especially in the large towns, by Belgian/ German companies which were interested in 
selling electro-mechanic material. 
 The greater sophistication and cost of the new technology led to the appearance 
of a new business model, based on the professionalism of management and on a larger 
size and more financial resources.   
 Its effect on the electrical industry and the Spanish mechanical construction was 
reduced due to the dependency on imports. Only the small local markets, electrical 
distributors and unsophisticated segments of the industry of capital assets were 
favoured, during the phase of the initial electrification of networks and during the 
“Hispanicising” of the tram sector in the twenties (in the case of the mechanical 
industry). 
The inherent advantages of the new system, (capacity, speed, regularity, comfort 
and reduction of unit costs) allowed the popularisation of urban transport. However, the 
appearance of new competitors (Underground and bus) started to captivate clients and 
slowly erode companies’ income from the twenties. Nevertheless, the Depression of the 
thirties, the Civil War and the long Post War delayed (until the sixties) the change of 
transport model from electricity to the internal combustion engine.  
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